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In South Asia concerns about water scarcity have
been mounting for some time, particularly in rural
areas where food productivity critically depends on
irrigation. Sustainable water consumption is
therefore a key development goal, otherwise any
strategy that aims to guarantee food security or
tackle rural poverty will ultimately fail. This is,
however, a particularly big challenge as there are
many factors that influence water supply and
demand; this means that it is often difficult to decide
what strategic approach should be taken to make
sure that water sources are used efficiently and
sustainably.
A new SANDEE study from India, has investigated the impact of water
pricing, institutions and unreliability of power supply on crop output of
the small-scale farmers in Western Uttar Pradesh. The study finds that
water supply, farm productivity and electricity supply are all interlinked.
It suggests an economic strategy that will provide farmers with a
dependable supply of electricity to drive irrigation pumps and a pricing
mechanism that will help ensure that water is used sustainably.
The present system of erratic power supply limits irrigation. One would
expect the limited water supply to be inefficiently favoring farmers
who irrigate using their own pumps, over those who buy water.
Surprisingly, the study finds this is not the case — water allocation is
efficient across farmers and plots. Farmers seem to have evolved social
institutions that govern irrigation efficiently, subject to the poor electricity
supply. Nevertheless, reliable electricity supply can increase output by
8-10%.  The current electricity pricing involves a flat fee unrelated to
quantum of electricity used; a poor incentive to supply electricity. The
study shows that a unit-based pricing system with reasonable rates
can incentivise the power supplier to supply adequate power, and
increase farmers’ profits net of additional power payments. This alone
will not solve the problem of water overuse. In order to reduce water
use to sustainable levels over time, a possible market-based strategy
could be to markup the unit electricity charge by about 15%.
This policy brief is based on SANDEE working paper
No. 19-06, ‘Groundwater Irrigation in North India:
Institutions and Markets’ by A.Banerji, J.V.
Meenakshi and Gauri Khanna from the Centre for
Development Economics at the Delhi School of
Economics. The full report is available at
www.sandeeonline.org
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Water scarcity is a huge concern
in rural India, where 80 percent of
the country’s water use occurs. This
study is based in Tabelagarhi village
in the state of Uttar Pradesh.  Here,
the popularity of water intensive
crops, such as paddy and
sugarcane, is responsible for
depleting groundwater tables.
Overexploitation of groundwater
resources raises concerns about
the future sustainability of
agriculture. It is therefore becoming
increasingly important that any
groundwater is used efficiently. To
work out how this can be done the
researchers look at the institutions
that govern water allocation. They
assess how well these institutions
perform and suggest how water use
can be improved in terms of
efficiency and sustainability.
Tabelagarhi is located in the
sugarcane belt of Western Uttar
Pradesh and faces many of the key
development issues common to
the region. In particular villagers
predominantly use groundwater
drawn from tube wells for irrigation.
A low and declining water table
makes it uneconomical to use
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Tabelagarhi has 165 households that cultivate sugarcane. Sugarcane
yields more than one harvest after a sowing; after the first harvest, the
crop is known as rattoon sugarcane (as opposed to freshly-sown or plant-
cane). Sugarcane sowing takes place in April-May, and harvesting is
between February and April. Rattoon sugarcane, on the other hand, is
harvested between late October and January. In this region, the first yield
is lower than from the rattoon sugarcane. Most farmers typically have
plots of both crops in the field.
Sugarcane is a water-intensive crop requiring one irrigation before sowing,
and regular irrigations thereafter. Conversations with experts and farmers
at the site indicate that pre-monsoon irrigations are particularly crucial
for plant growth. In 2004, the monsoon was delayed, and there was no
rain in June and July. In this situation, the general opinion was that one
irrigation every 20 days was needed. Water from tube wells is transported
to plots largely via unlined channels. So there are seepage losses; but
these are restricted by the relative proximity of other tube wells.
Tabelagarhi, as is the norm in many parts of India, is subject to erratic
power supply. For example, power can fluctuate from between 3-5 hours
a day to between 8-10 hours a day. As explained, for sugarcane, timely
irrigations early in the season are critical to crop growth; thus the lack of
regular electricity supply means that in summer months with no rain,
tube wells need to be kept running flat out whenever power is available.
INVESTIGATING GROUNDWATER USE
The study first looks at how efficiently groundwater in Tabelagarhi is
allocated among the farm plots. Although there is some inefficiency,
mathematical simulations show that re-allocation of water may not
lead to significant productivity gains. One can infer from this, and
through direct observation, a form of social contract at work, that helps
to allocate water efficiently. Villagers work together informally to fix
water prices at the beginning of a growing season since they often
double up as buyers and sellers in the water market due to fragmentation
of land. Given the fairly low water price and the relative shortage of
water (due to paucity of electricity), tube well owners wanting to maximize
profits from water sales could choose to sell little water, using most of
it on their own plots. It is remarkable that tube well owners actually do
not try to maximize profits in this fashion. They sell substantial volumes
of water even though it would make better economic sense to use the
water to boost the productivity of their own land. This is a striking finding
that stands in sharp contrast to much of the literature on this issue in
South Asia. Many studies argue that tube well owners exercise some
monopoly power over water buyers, leading to inefficient water allocation
and inequality.
diesel to fuel the pumps that run
the wells. Electric pumps are
therefore used to draw water up
from depths of over seventy feet or
more.  The region also suffers from
an erratic and inadequate
electricity supply and consequently
an erratic supply of irrigation water.
Many farm plots, particularly
smaller ones, do not have tube
wells. As a result, a lot of plots are
irrigated using water purchased
from villagers who have tube wells
on their farms.
The study is based on a sample of
73 tube wells and a survey of all
the plots serviced by these wells.
These 326 plots belong to 105
farmers. Three types of data are
used: tube well-specific, plot-
specific, and farm household-
specific.  Plot-specific data is used
to estimate the demand for
irrigation water, tube well data to
estimate water supply
characteristics, and household





Tabelagarhi village, the subject of
this study, is in the Baghpat district,
in the sugarcane belt of Western
Uttar Pradesh. Sugarcane is one of
the most water intensive crops
widely cultivated in North India
and, by and large, groundwater is
the only source of irrigation for crops
grown in and around Tabelagarhi.
The crop is therefore a major reason
why the water table in this area has
witnessed a steady decline over the
last few decades.
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The social contract in evidence in the Tabelagarhi region makes sense.
Land holding in the region is fragmented and this means that practically
all water sellers also have plots for which they themselves have to buy
water. What a water seller loses by selling water ‘below value’ on his own
plot, he can make up by buying ‘cheap’ water from another supplier.
Simulations also show that agricultural yields in the region would be
about 18% lower if tube well owners tried to maximize their individual
economic profits (see Table ). As the Table shows most of this reduction
would come from a reduction in the yields of buyers of water. It is thought
that farmers in the region have been able to develop and implement this
effective water allocation system, thanks to the relative social homogeneity
of Tabelagarhi and surrounding villages.
THE ELECTRICITY
PROBLEM
Despite the existence of the social
contract system in and around
Tabelagarhi, it is clear that the
region’s erratic and inadequate
power supply does have a
significant impact on agricultural
productivity. There is strong
evidence that many farmers receive
an inadequate water supply and
that water is, in effect, rationed.
This is shown by the fact that when
the marginal value product of water
on a plot is compared with the price
of water (if the plot uses purchased
water) or the marginal cost of water
extraction (if the plot has a tube
well on it), then the marginal value
product is, on average, twice the
cost of water supply. In other words,
farmers could increase profits by
using more water (if it was
available).
This water rationing has many
implications. Many key land
preparation decisions are made in
the first few summer months,
before farmers get to know how
power availability will affect irrigation
over the season. This uncertainty
means that many farmers do not
apply optimal levels of fertilizers and
other agricultural inputs. If farmers
could be confident about power and
water supply they would have the
confidence to use more
agricultural inputs which could
increase yield by 8%-10% on
average.
TABLE : A COMPARISON OF CURRENT YIELDS WITH
PROJECTED YIELD IF EACH TUBEWELL OWNER ACTED
AS A PROFIT MAXIMISER (PER BIGHA)
Plot Category Sample Yield Projected (Simulated) Yield
All Plots 59.27 48.25
Plots with Single-Owner TW 60.36 61.95
Plots with Joint-Owner TW 59.77 61.10
Plots that bought water 53.41 16.36
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This policy brief is an output of a re-
search project funded by SANDEE. The
view’s expressed here are not neces-
sarily those of SANDEE’s sponsors.
SANDEE
The South Asian Network for
Development and Environmental
Economics (SANDEE) is a regional
network that seeks to bring together
analysts from the different countries
in South Asia to address their
development-environment problems.
Its mission is to strengthen the
capacity of individuals and
institutions in South Asia to undertake
research on the inter-linkages among
economic development, poverty, and
environmental change, and, to
disseminate practical information that
can be applied to development
policies. SANDEE’s activities cover
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
SANDEE’s Policy Brief Series seek to in-
form a wide and general audience about











In Tabelagarhi, farmers pay a flat annual charge (based on the horsepower
of their pumps) in return for the right to use as much power as they
require. This gives no incentive to the power provider (here, the State
Electricity Board) to provide adequate power. The water rationing in the
Tabelagarhi region is therefore symptomatic of the pan-Indian problem
of poor power infrastructure, and a lack of good incentives to produce
and supply adequate power. If power prices were based on the amount of
electricity that farmers use, it would give more incentive to the power
producer to supply adequate, reliable power. If instead of a flat charge, a
unit-pricing mechanism at reasonable levels was followed, it would
improve irrigation supply and yields could go up by as much as ten
percent. Increased productivity would pay for the higher irrigation costs
that farmers might have to bear due to higher power prices.
This scenario obviously leaves the challenge of sustainability unanswered.
With an improved electricity supply and electricity unit costs set at a
reasonable level, irrigation volumes will continue to seriously deplete the
water table. It is clear that with the speed of growth in the region, traditional
rights of water use are proving inadequate as a mechanism to govern
water use, since individual farmers are ignoring the negative impact their
actions have on the communal water resource. As none of the standard
suggestions for water conservation (such as water pricing) have been
tried in the region, there is clearly a need for more research.
MAKING WATER USE SUSTAINABLE
Increasing the price of electricity supplied to farmers may be one possible
way forward. This study suggests that an electricity price marked up about
15% over the unit cost of electricity may reduce farmers’ water extraction
to a socially optimal level. The resulting decrease in farmers’ incomes
could, in principle, be compensated through lump sum transfers.
The implementation of such a proposal will, unsurprisingly, be problematic.
The local power provider lacks credibility and, while it is likely that
sugarcane cultivation in the study area will be profitable even with
substantially higher energy costs, this may not be true for all parts of the
sugarcane belt. Deeper structural changes, such as allowing competition
between multiple power providers, may be the ultimate answer, but this
would require a huge regime change. Despite these significant challenges,
it is important to forge ahead, perhaps with a few experiments and more
careful and broader studies, because the water crisis has to be addressed.
